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“Sublime in Its Magnitude”:
The Emancipation Proclamation
Allen C. Guelzo

8

hich would you rather memorize? This sentence: “Four score
and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to
the proposition that all men are created equal.” Or this:
Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord
one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by
the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the
following, to wit:
“That on the ﬁrst day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any
State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be
in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward,
and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States,
including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to
repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make
for their actual freedom. That the Executive will, on the ﬁrst day of
January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of
States, if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be
in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or
the people thereof, shall on that day be, in good faith, represented in
the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualiﬁed voters of such State shall have
participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony,
be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof,
are not then in rebellion against the United States.”
65
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Now, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue
of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy
of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against authority and
government of the United States, and as a ﬁt and necessary war measure for
suppressing said rebellion, do, on this ﬁrst day of January, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with
my purpose so to do publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred
days, from the day ﬁrst above mentioned, order and designate as the States
and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively, are this day in
rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit . . .

Both passages are by the same author—Abraham Lincoln—and were written
in the same year—1863. But no explaining is needed to conclude that they
couldn’t be more different. The ﬁrst sentence, from the Gettysburg Address,
is arresting and eloquent, and it begins an appeal that soars to the very top of
American political rhetoric; the other, the opening of the Emancipation Proclamation, is so pedestrian as almost to make the word boring fail on the lips.
And thereby hangs a tale of contradictions: the Gettysburg Address was, after
all, only a few simple words uttered at the dedication of a national cemetery,
while the proclamation was a long-awaited, headline-bursting emancipation of
more than three million slaves, based on a highly contentious, thin-ice reading
of the presidential war powers. Lincoln’s own estimate (if we can believe Ward
Hill Lamon) of the Gettysburg Address was that it “fell on the audience like
a wet blanket” and was a “ﬂat failure” that “wouldn’t scour.”1 But he thought
the Emancipation Proclamation was “the central act of my administration, and
the great event of the nineteenth century.”2 So, shouldn’t the proclamation be
more dramatic, its language more powerful, and its effect more electric than
a mere cemetery dedication? And what should people conclude when instead
the proclamation sounds, as Karl Marx unfeelingly put it, like “ordinary summonses sent by one lawyer to another on the opposing side.”3
The puzzlement that results from the contrast between Lincoln the Eloquent
and Lincoln the Emancipator has, over the years, generated three suspicions:
1. The blandness of the proclamation’s language is so thoroughly out-ofcharacter that it must be revelatory of Lincoln’s personal intentions,
and that in turn must mean that he was not in earnest when he wrote
it. If he had been, he could have been as eloquent an emancipator
as he was a cemetery dedicator. That he wasn’t demonstrates a clear
lack of interest and enthusiasm in emancipation and therefore in the
liberation of black people. “Cold, forbidding, with all the passion
and eloquence of a real estate deed, the Proclamation doesn’t contain
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a single quotable sentence and doesn’t enumerate a single principle
hostile to slavery,” complains Lerone Bennett, Lincoln’s most searing
(and reckless) modern critic.4
2. Looked at closely, the proclamation is ﬁlled with legal loopholes, the
most glaring being the exemption of the slaves in the border states and
the Union-occupied portions of the Confederacy, where Lincoln left
them in bondage “precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.”
This created an incongruity which the Times of London was swift to
mock: “Where he has no power Mr. Lincoln will set the negroes free;
where he regains power he will consider them as slaves.”5 And once
again, it suggests that Lincoln was more interested in legalistic niceties
than he was in the oppression suffered by slaves whom it was perfectly
within his power to liberate.
3. Lincoln took elaborate care to explain the proclamation, not as a cry
for deliverance or the triumph of liberty, but as a military strategy.
He was, in other words, more interested in undermining the Southern
rebellion than in freeing black people from bondage, and his principal aim was not to bestow freedom but to convert the slaves into yet
another Northern war asset, or to rally Northern public opinion, or
to bluff the European powers into standing down from intervention
in what Lincoln was cynically portraying as a crusade against slavery. The proclamation was, to use Walter D. Kennedy’s phrase in his
recent anti-Lincoln essay, “Lincoln: The Un-Emancipator,” merely “a
propaganda ploy to inﬂuence abolitionist England and France not to
recognize the Confederacy.”6
As a result, it has now become commonplace to say that Lincoln had no great
intentions in view when he issued the Emancipation Proclamation, that his real
aim was to restore the Union and use emancipation as a tool to whip up public
fervor for a military cause that was ﬂagging, and that he never really wanted
to emancipate any slaves but was forced into it by the exigencies of the war.
Yet, there is no solid reason to doubt Lincoln’s claim in 1864 that “I am
naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not
remember when I did not so think, and feel.”7 Slavery “was a great & crying
injustice an enormous national crime,” Lincoln argued to his Illinois political
ally, Joseph Gillespie, in the 1850s.8 It violated natural law, by robbing the
worker of the fruits of his labor: “The ant, who has toiled and dragged a crumb
to his nest, will furiously defend the fruit of his labor, against whatever robber
assails him.” In exactly the same way, even “the most dumb and stupid slave
that ever toiled for a master, does constantly know that he is wronged.”9 Almost
as bad, black slavery was a blot on the conﬁdence of the American republic as
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the champion of the principle of liberal democracy. “Our republican robe is
soiled, and trailed in the dust,” Lincoln warned. “Let us repurify it. . . . Let
us turn slavery from its claims of ‘moral right’ [and] return it to the position
our fathers gave it; and there let it rest in peace.”10 Slavery, in fact, grated
personally on Lincoln’s self-made passion for work and social mobility, since
it condemned one category of men to a lifetime of labor without the hope of
improvement while turning another into a shiftless aristocracy that scorned
honest labor as “slave work.” “When one starts poor,” Lincoln said in 1860,
“free society is such that he knows he can better his condition; he knows that
there is no ﬁxed condition of labor, for his whole life.” And Lincoln was his
own best example. “I am not ashamed to confess that twenty-ﬁve years ago
I was a hired laborer, mauling rails, at work on a ﬂat-boat—just what might
happen to any poor man’s son.”11 (Years later, Frederick Douglass would attribute his own surprisingly nondiscriminatory and evenhanded welcome
by Lincoln to “the similarity with which I had fought my way up, we both
starting at the lowest round of the ladder”).12 But slavery, by its very nature,
“ﬁxed” the slave permanently to his shackles. “The condition of the negro slave
in America,” Lincoln wrote, “is now as ﬁxed, and hopeless of change for the
better, as that of the lost souls of the ﬁnally impenitent.”13 Slavery deprived
the slave not only of the natural fruit of his labor but of all hope “that in due
time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all
should have an equal chance.”14 By contrast, slave owners would only come to
associate labor with enslavement and to prize informality, relaxation, and scorn
for work. Slavery, Lincoln told Gillespie, is “the most glittering ostentatious
& displaying property in the world. . . . Its ownership betokened not only the
possession of wealth but indicated the gentleman of leisure who was above
and scorned labour.” On all of those counts, wrote Lincoln’s congressional
ally and biographer, Isaac Arnold, emancipation became Lincoln’s “deepest,
strongest desire of the soul,” and from the time of his election, Lincoln “hoped
and expected to be the Liberator of the slaves.”15
What is true, however, is that Lincoln made no effort until 1854 to act with
very much force on these convictions. Slavery had been legalized in the Southern
states of the Union as part of the “federal consensus” that created the Union and
the Constitution, and lawyer that he was, Lincoln shrank from making the sort
of frontal challenge that might destroy slavery, the Union, and the Constitution
together.16 Even if he wanted to take direct action before the 1850s, there was the
simple problem of knowing what direct action to take: slavery was the product
of state, not federal, enactments, and a constitutional ﬁrewall prevented the
federal government from intervening in what belonged exclusively to slave-state
jurisdictions. But Lincoln did not believe that direct action was really needed
anyway, simply because he was persuaded that slavery, pent-up as it was in the
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Southern states by the Missouri Compromise of 1820, would gradually die out
on its own. Nor, given the prevailing white supremacist thinking of his era, did
Lincoln have much idea of what would happen if the slaves could be liberated.
“If all earthly power were given me,” Lincoln admitted, “I should not know
what to do, as to the existing institution. . . . I think I would not hold one in
slavery, at any rate; yet the point is not clear enough for me to denounce people
upon.” Not being entirely free of the racial shadow of white supremacist thinking
himself, it was a question Lincoln preferred not to face: “Free them, and make
them politically and socially, our equals?” he asked aloud. “My own feelings
will not admit of this; and if mine would, we well know that those of the great
mass of white people will not.” He knew well enough to wonder “whether this
feeling accords with justice and sound judgment,” but in Illinois, which not
only banned black slaves but free black immigration as well, justice was “not
the sole question, if indeed, it is any part of it.”17
Then came Stephen A. Douglas’s Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, which
opened the old Louisiana Purchase territories, from which slavery had once
been excluded by the Missouri Compromise, to the introduction of slavery.
At once, Lincoln realized that slavery was being given a new lease on life, and
so he embarked on a campaign to reimpose limitations on its expansion—a
campaign that eventually led him to his famous Senate race against Douglas
in 1858 and to the presidency in 1860. At no point, signiﬁcantly, did Lincoln
campaign to abolish slavery; he was perfectly willing to work for its containment, but abolition posed all the old questions of who had the authority to do
the abolishing, what would happen to the newly freed slaves, and what would
they do once freed. (In fact, in 1857, the Supreme Court even made the antislavery campaign more difﬁcult in the infamous Dred Scott decision, declaring
not only that blacks could not be considered citizens but that neither Congress
nor the executive branch had the authority to prevent the expansion of slavery
into the territories.) Besides, Lincoln was never convinced that sudden, immediate abolition was a workable strategy for emancipation: it reeked too much
of self-righteous moralism and was too reckless of unintended consequences.
The best path Lincoln could imagine was a movement that involved “three
main features—gradual—compensation—and [the] vote of the people”18 —in
other words, a timetable for emancipating slaves as they reached certain ages
(this being the mechanism by which all the Northern states had freed their
slaves decades before), a buyout to the owners to induce their cooperation
and to provide sufﬁcient liquidity for them to hire their newly freed slaves as
free workers, and some form of action by the state legislatures to circumvent
challenges to emancipation in the federal courts.
This, then, was the situation Lincoln confronted in 1861 as he took up the
reins of ofﬁce as president; and understanding that situation goes a long way
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toward explaining why Lincoln did not reach at once for slave emancipation
when the Civil War broke out. In the larger sense, he did not have the power
to do so—that power rested with the states, and that meant wooing the state
legislatures through “soft,” gradual emancipation and funded buyouts. But
almost as dark a reason why Lincoln made no move toward emancipation,
always hovering in the background, was the Supreme Court, which had handed
down Dred Scott—and which might do something similar to any emancipation
order Lincoln wrote. At the end of the day, emancipation would always end
up as “a judicial question. How the courts would decide it, he did not know
and could give no answer.”19
But that does not mean Lincoln was content merely to do nothing about
emancipation. If wooing the state legislatures was what it took, he would do
the wooing. The outbreak of the Civil War might have put the slave-state
legislatures of the Confederacy beyond his reach, but the four border slave
states of Delaware, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland remained within the
Union and within the orbit of presidential inﬂuence, while the District of
Columbia was governed directly by Congress and required nothing beyond
an act of Congress to make emancipation happen. As early as November
1861, Lincoln had drafted an emancipation plan for Delaware that offered
to swap $719,200 “in the six per cent bonds of said United States” in return
for the Delaware legislature’s agreement that there “shall be neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude” within the state.20 He made the same offer more
broadly to the congressional delegations of the other border states in March
1862, offering “to cooperate with any state which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such state pecuniary aid, to be used by such state in
it’s [sic] discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private,
produced by such change of system.”21 And the following month, he signed
into law a congressional measure ending slavery in the District of Columbia.
All of these plans had something in them to irritate the abolitionists: they
did not immediately free the slaves, which looked to the abolitionists like a
violation of justice in deference to the dictates of prudence; they gave money to
slaveholders, which reminded the abolitionists of nothing so much as a reward
for having robbed others; and they were content to wait until slaveholders (or
at least their legislatures) were ready. “You will not inspire Old Abe,” grumbled
one abolitionist, Senator Zachariah Chandler, “with courage, decision, or enterprise, with a galvanic battery.”22 But from Lincoln’s point of view, his “soft”
emancipation schemes had a number of inarguable practical advantages.
Compensation might look like blood money, but if it persuaded slave owners
to relinquish slavery, then the price would be far cheaper than paying for a civil
war, which required literal blood money in far greater amounts. “In the mere
ﬁnancial, or pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the census-tables
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and Treasury-reports before him, can readily see for himself how very soon the
current expenditures of this war would purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves
in any named State,” Lincoln argued. If the border slave states bit on “soft”
emancipation, it would deﬂate Confederate enthusiasm and thus hasten an
end to the war. “The leaders of the existing insurrection entertain the hope that
. . . all the slave states North of such part will then say the ‘Union, for which
we have struggled, being already gone, we now choose to go with the Southern
section,’” Lincoln explained. “To deprive them of this hope, substantially ends
the rebellion; and the initiation of emancipation completely deprives them of
it, as to all the states initiating it.” Above all, “soft” emancipation, as a state
enactment, avoided review by the Supreme Court. “Such a proposition, on
the part of the general government, sets up no claim of a right, by federal authority, to interfere with slavery within state limits” and therefore leaves “the
absolute control of the subject, in each case, to the state and it’s [sic] people,
immediately interested.”23
Unhappily, these advantages had one fatal ﬂaw, and that was Lincoln’s assumption that the slaveholders’ desire for a buyout would trump the racism
that bound white slave owners emotionally, ideologically, and culturally to the
slave system. Lincoln had always believed, wrote William H. Herndon to a
friend, that self-interest “moved the man to every voluntary act of his life.”24
But racism in the border states proved much more powerful than self-interest.
Congress had no difﬁculty passing a compensated emancipation scheme for
the District of Columbia, where Congress was the legislature; but in Delaware
and the other border states, truculent state legislators and slaveholders threw
Lincoln’s “soft” emancipation schemes right back in his face. After a “stormy
debate” among the border-state congressmen, twenty of them replied that
they would never cooperate with compensated emancipation and that Lincoln
should “conﬁne yourself to your constitutional authority.”25
These ill tidings came crowding in on Lincoln in the spring of 1862, followed by even worse tidings from the battleﬁeld. The year 1862 had started
off optimistically for the Union armies, with Ulysses S. Grant seizing the key
Confederate western outposts of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, New Orleans
falling to the U.S. Navy, and General George B. McClellan poised to launch
his enormous Army of the Potomac in a grand land-and-sea combined operation against the Confederate capital at Richmond. The optimism was quickly
obliterated, however: Grant suffered a catastrophic near-defeat at Shiloh in
April, and thereafter Union momentum in the West evaporated; McClellan’s
great offensive crawled up the James River peninsula toward Richmond, then
stalled, and ﬁnally fell back to Harrison’s Landing. And to top off defeat with
insult, when Lincoln came down to visit McClellan’s army, McClellan treated
the president to an ultimatum that warned him that any efforts on his part
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to “interfere with the relations of servitude” would “rapidly disintegrate our
present Armies.”26
This posed two immediate problems for Lincoln: First, entirely apart from
whatever warning McClellan was trying to send Lincoln in his “Harrison’s
Landing Letter,” the multiple failures of the Union armies that spring and
summer might mean that the war could not be won by the Union government, and a negotiated peace might soon have to be contemplated. And if the
Union government could not win, then it could never reestablish authority
over the slave states, and that would kill all hope of ending slavery by state
legislative action. Second, McClellan himself, who had quarreled frequently
with Lincoln over military policy and who had no hesitation, as a Democrat,
about criticizing Lincoln’s political initiatives, might turn on Lincoln and
attempt a political intervention. This was not as far-fetched as it sounds: McClellan and his ofﬁcer corps had made a number of threatening noises about
plans “to march upon the capital and disperse Congress as Cromwell did the
Long Parliament” if Lincoln ever tried to emancipate the slaves.27 The longer
Lincoln sat and dallied, the more likely it was that an intervention might occur. Now was the time, if ever there was one, for a preemptive emancipation
move by Lincoln.
Lincoln did have one last arrow in his quiver that might sanction such a
move: the so-called war powers of the president. The Constitution provides
that the president serve as commander-in-chief of the armed forces in time of
war or insurrection, and certainly the Civil War counted as an insurrection as
much as anything could. What was unclear, however, was just what functions
might be attached to a civilian “commander-in-chief.” George Washington had
literally understood this provision to mean, at the time of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1795, that he would take the ﬁeld as the military chief of the army. But
Washington was a soldier by profession. Only two of his successors had been
(Andrew Jackson and Zachary Taylor), and only a few others (Franklin Pierce,
James Monroe, William Henry Harrison) had spent serious amateur time in the
military; the rest, including Lincoln (who had never been more than a captain
in the militia), were civilians whose worst decision would have been to take over
active control of the armies. Nor did anyone have much understanding of what
the legal niceties of being a “commander-in-chief” might involve. There had
been only one signiﬁcant federal court decision about the operation of martial
law, and one attorney general, Caleb Cushing, helplessly admitted that “we are
without law on the subject.”28 If no one was sure what martial law was, who
could have any real inkling about the president’s “war powers”?
Nevertheless, Lincoln’s allies had been pressing him since the beginning
of the war to use those “war powers” to “emancipate all persons held as slaves
in any military district in a state of insurrection” with a war powers procla-
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mation.29 Lincoln, who anticipated more than enough legal complications
around “soft” emancipation, did not need to add to them by creeping further
out on the legal limb with a “hard” emancipation proclamation. He had
already pulled back the bit on two Union generals—John Charles Frémont
and David Hunter—who had tried to use martial law proclamations in their
districts to emancipate slaves—and it made little sense to duplicate their
recklessness. But by the summer of 1862, Lincoln’s “soft” emancipation plans
had gone onto the shelf (at least until new state legislative elections returned
legislatures in Delaware, Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland that were more
willing to listen to the siren song of Lincoln’s buyouts); and if the war ended
in some form of negotiated peace, or if McClellan ﬁnally gathered the boldness to lead the Army of the Potomac in some form of military intervention,
Lincoln might never get a chance to take those plans off the shelf again.
“Our common country is in great peril,” Lincoln warned the border state
congressmen on July 12, “demanding the loftiest views, and boldest actions
to bring it speedy relief.”30
Ten days later, Lincoln took the “boldest actions” himself. He read to his
cabinet a draft of a war powers proclamation threatening to free the Confederacy’s slaves “as a ﬁt and necessary military measure” on the strength of his
standing as “Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”
by January 1 if the Confederates did not end their resistance. The cabinet was
almost struck dumb, since Lincoln had kept this measure concealed from
their attention for more than a month, perhaps as long as three months. The
time, however, had been well spent, because the proclamation was as carefully
crafted to operate within the bounds of the presidential war powers as Lincoln
knew how. There were no lofty ﬂights of Lincolnian rhetoric, and no eloquent
appeals to liberty or justice, since eloquence alone would have accomplished
little if the proclamation were brought under federal court scrutiny. His one
hope for making emancipation pass judicial muster was a sober invocation of
military necessity: that what he was doing was legally justiﬁed by the military
contribution a slave emancipation would make toward winning the war and
preserving the Constitution. Hence, the proclamation would have an escape
clause (the Confederates could submit and cancel the rebellion—although, in
that case, they would once again subject themselves to the smiling blandishments of Lincoln’s compensated emancipation plans), and it would be limited
only to those parts of the Confederacy that were actually in rebellion at the
time of the proclamation’s release (which meant, not the border states and not
even the occupied districts of the South, since the ﬁrst had never been at war
with the government, and the second were no longer).
But even that was enough to make the hearts of his cabinet skip a beat.
Secretary of State William Seward (who was himself no slouch on the subject
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of emancipation) warned that, from the perspective of foreign policy, issuing
the proclamation while the Union armies were staggering in defeated circles
would look like an act of desperation, maybe even an incitement to the slaves
to rise up in a racial bloodbath against the masters. “It may be viewed as the
last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help,” Seward objected,
“the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia
stretching forth her hands to the government.”31 Lincoln took the point and
agreed to wait until the Union had won some signiﬁcant military victory, so
that the proclamation could look like it was adding strength to strength.
This was not a delaying tactic. Although Lincoln had only the most meager
religious proﬁle of his own, he had been struggling ever since the summer’s
cheerless defeats to discern the direction in which God was taking this war,
and he was now seeking out a sign that would signal to him that God indeed
favored an act of emancipation. When the Confederate army under Robert
E. Lee crossed the Potomac to invade Maryland in September 1862, Lincoln
upped the ante of his promise to Seward by “promising God that he would
issue the paper if God would give us the victory over Lee’s army.”32 The victory
came, in large measure because a copy of Lee’s campaign orders mysteriously
fell into the hands of Union soldiers—a sign within the sign, so to speak—and
allowed McClellan and the Army of the Potomac to pin Lee into a disastrous
back-to-the-wall position at Antietam on September 17. McClellan, being
George McClellan, allowed Lee to slip back across the Potomac into Virginia
afterwards. But Antietam was still a victory, and Lincoln now proposed to keep
his vow. Once the news was certain, on September 20, that Lee had withdrawn
and the battle was over, Lincoln rewrote the proclamation, and on Monday,
September 22, read and presented it to the cabinet as a preliminary to releasing
it as a military order. As of January 1, all slaves held in “the States, and parts
of states” that “shall then be in rebellion against the United States . . . shall be
then, thenceforward, and forever free . . . of their servitude and not again held
as slaves.” And with a cool eye on the cooperation of generals like McClellan,
Lincoln added that the Union military would “recognize and maintain . . .
any efforts” the slaves “may make for their actual freedom”—which sounded
ominously like a pledge to encourage slave insurrection—and would now begin
recruiting black soldiers to ﬁght in the Union armies.
Not surprisingly, the Confederates made no move toward surrendering.
So, on January 1, 1863, after an exhausting morning presiding over the annual
White House New Year’s reception, Lincoln walked upstairs to his secondﬂoor ofﬁce, where he met Seward with the formal copy of the Emancipation
Proclamation and signed it into law. “If my name ever goes into history it will
be for this act, and my whole soul is in it,” Lincoln said, and to emphasize
that what the proclamation had decreed was indeed right, and not just legal,
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Lincoln allowed himself one bow to the angels: “Upon this act, sincerely
believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military
necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious
favor of Almighty God.”33
Lincoln believed that “the name which is connected with this act will never
be forgotten.”34 True, the Emancipation Proclamation might not render slaves
in the Confederacy automatically free to wander off the plantation unhindered;
but it did guarantee that once Union forces swarmed over those plantations,
the slaves would cease to be slaves and would never be slaves again. By 1865,
William Seward estimated that two hundred thousand runaways, fugitives,
and “contrabands” had placed themselves under the umbrella of the proclamation on the broad upland road to freedom.35 On those terms alone, the prince
of the abolitionists, William Lloyd Garrison, lauded the proclamation as “a
great historic event, sublime in its magnitude, momentous and beneﬁcent in
its far-reaching consequences,” and Garrison congratulated Lincoln for “a
mighty work for the freedom of millions.”36 Still, Lincoln never got over his
anxiety that the courts might shred the proclamation and the whole idea of
presidential “war powers” that underlay it. It was unlikely they would do so
during the war; but once Lincoln proclaimed the wartime emergency over,
all bets were off. “I think it is valid in law, and will be so held by the courts,”
Lincoln told a Union general in July 1863. But even if they didn’t, “I think I
shall not retract or repudiate it. Those who shall have tasted actual freedom I
believe can never be slaves, or quasi slaves again.”37
All the same, Lincoln was a man for whom prudence was the polestar of
his conscious life, and it was prudence that dictated, in 1864, that he backstop
the proclamation by urging Congress to adopt the Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, which would not just free slaves but would obliterate slavery
as a legalized institution everywhere in the United States. As an amendment
to the Constitution, emancipation would thus be placed forever beyond the
reach of the courts; and as a legislative act, it would conform to the pattern
of emancipation with which Lincoln had always felt most comfortable.38 In
the strictest legal sense, it was the Thirteenth Amendment that eliminated
slavery, especially since the Emancipation Proclamation was superseded by
the Thirteenth Amendment before the wartime emergency had ended and
was never tried on constitutional grounds in the federal courts. But, in fact,
the Thirteenth Amendment is really only a coda to the Emancipation Proclamation. Nor is it likely that Lincoln would have ever backed down from
the proclamation, even in the face of the courts. (He warned Congress that
he would resign ﬁrst.) He was not going to break faith with the slaves he had
freed—“I should be damned in time & in eternity for so doing”—and he was
not going to lay aside a weapon that had caused so much fear and disruption
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within the Confederacy. “No human power can subdue this rebellion without
using the Emancipation lever as I have done.”39
Of course, the oddity we all deal with concerning the Emancipation Proclamation is that Lincoln has been damned, not for backing down from it, but
for issuing it the way he did. All that this really demonstrates, however, is a
lack of understanding of the real dilemma Lincoln faced. He could not have
acted directly, except as a commander-in-chief promulgating a war powers
proclamation, and even then he could not have acted universally. Likewise,
he could not have written ethereal, lofty prose into the proclamation because
it was a legal document whose every phrase would be scrutinized. The critics
who score Lincoln for not having done “more” in the Emancipation Proclamation overlook how easy it would have been for him not to have issued it at all.
The war could, conceivably, have been won without it; and he was under no
obligation (at least, no earthly one) to have kept his “vow” to follow the Antietam battle with emancipation. What is extraordinary is that, with so many
disincentives staring him in the face—the risks in law, in politics, and with
his generals—he kept the vow and kept emancipation at the forefront of his
policies. That is the standard by which Lincoln and his proclamation should
be measured; and it is a standard that points to greatness, for the Emancipation Proclamation and for its author.
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